Studies of health system responsiveness mostly focus on the demand side by investigating the association between sociodemographic characteristics of patients and their reported level of responsiveness. However, little is known about the influence of supply-side factors. This paper addresses that research gap by analysing the role of hospital-specialty characteristics in explaining variations in patients' evaluation of responsiveness from a sample of about 38,700 in-patients treated in public hospitals within the Italian Region of Emilia-Romagna. The analysis is carried out by adopting a 2-step procedure. First, we use patients' self-reported data to derive 5 measures of responsiveness at the hospital-specialty level. By estimating a generalised ordered probit model, we are able to correct for variations in individual reporting behaviour due to the health status of patients and their experience of being in pain. Second, we run cross-sectional regressions to investigate the association between patients' responsiveness and potential supply-side drivers, including waiting times, staff workload, the level of spending on non-clinical facilities, the level of spending on staff education and training, and the proportion of staff expenditure between nursing and administrative staff. Results suggest that responsiveness is to some extent influenced by the supply-side drivers considered.
Most of previous studies on health system responsiveness have focused on the demand-side by investigating the association between sociodemographic characteristics of patients and their reported level of responsiveness. Some of these studies have adopted an international comparison perspective (e.g., Rice, Robone, & Smith, 2012; Sirven, Santos-Eggimann, & Spagnoli, 2012; Valentine, Darby, & Bonsel, 2008) , whereas others have adopted a national one (Adesanya et al., 2012; Ebrahimipour et al., 2013; Fiorentini, Ragazzi, & Robone, 2015; Luo, Wang, Lu, & Liu, 2013; Röttger, Blümel, Fuchs, & Busse, 2014) . However, little is yet known about the influence of supply-side factors on responsiveness. A few studies have investigated the supply-side determinants of responsiveness with countries taken as units of observation (Anderson & Hussey, 2001; Blendon, Kim, & Benson, 2001; Valentine, Ortiz, et al., 2003; World Health Organization, 2000) . By contrast, in this paper, we conduct a supply-side analysis at a more disaggregated level by analysing the influence of hospital-specialty characteristics in explaining variations in patients' evaluation of responsiveness. The use of data at disaggregated level has been shown of paramount importance to increase the reliability of analyses about hospital systems, because it allows, for example, to take into account differences in accounting principles and in the definitions in the outcomes of interest, which may exist across different observational units (e.g., health-care providers) (Gravelle & Backhouse, 1987; Rice, Robone, & Smith, 2010) . Earlier work has shown that hospital characteristics play an important role in explaining differences in patients' evaluation of healthcare (e.g., Fiorentini et al., 2015; Robone, Fiorentini, Nicoli, & Rodella, 2014; Sjetne, Veenstra, & Stavem, 2007; Young, Meterko, & Desai, 2000) . However, differently from previous studies on responsiveness, which treated hospitals as "black-boxes," the present paper investigates which supply factors affect responsiveness not only across hospitals but also within hospitals.
In order to address the above research question, we use a unique dataset that combines information about responsiveness evaluations drawn from a sample of about 38,700 in-patients treated in public hospitals in the Italian Region of Emilia-Romagna with data on hospital-specialty characteristics from the hospital's annual financial and administrative reports. In this sample, patients' data on responsiveness are self-reported and measured on an ordinal categorical scale. A common issue in survey research is that individuals are likely to interpret the meaning of the available response categories in a way that systematically differs across populations or population subgroups (King, Murray, Salomon, & Tandon, 2004) . If this happens, a given level of responsiveness is unlikely to be rated equally by all respondents, thereby compromising data comparability. To address this issue, known as "reporting heterogeneity" (Rice et al., 2012) , we perform a two-step analysis following an established methodology (e.g., Fally, Paillacar, & Terra, 2010; Huber & Stanig, 2011; Street et al., 2012) . First, we purge differences in individual reporting behaviour due to patients' health status and their experience of physical pain by estimating a generalised ordered probit (GOP) model (Terza, 1985) . Second, we run cross-sectional regression models in order to investigate the association between patients' responsiveness and potential supply-side drivers.
Our results are consistent with a theoretical model of hospital behaviour in which the chief executive officer (CEO) maximises an objective function where revenues depend on her effort to improve quality along the dimensions directly perceived by patients (responsiveness). More precisely, our findings indicate a strong negative association between the workload of nurses and responsiveness for the domains "communication" and "confidentiality." They also reveal that overall patients' responsiveness is positively affected by the proportion of total staff expenditure invested in nursing staff. For the domain "prompt attention," we also find a positive and significant effect on responsiveness of the proportion of expenditure invested in administrative staff, and a negative and significant effect of waiting times. Last, the level of spending on non-clinical facilities and on staff education and training activities has a strong positive effect on responsiveness.
This study innovates over previous literature on health system responsiveness by shedding some light into the black-box of the determinants of responsiveness at hospital-specialty level. Moreover, as far as we know, this is the first study to provide evidence in favour of the use of self-reported measures of responsiveness as credible indicators of how patients are treated by the health system. One issue raised by previous studies on responsiveness is the scarcity of objective measures (e.g., waiting times or space available in the hospital rooms) for several aspects of responsiveness . This has made it difficult to compare self-reported measures with more objective ones, as has been done, for instance, with regard to health status (see, for example, Crossley & Kennedy, 2002; Baker, Stabile, & Deri, 2004; Jurges, 2007) . Our results point to a strong correlation between the two sets of measures. This suggests that patients' self-reports may be good predictors of more objective measures of health system responsiveness, which are more costly to collect.
| BACKGROUND

| Institutional setting and theoretical background
Our analysis focuses on a sample of elective inpatients treated in public hospitals located within the Italian Region of Emilia-Romagna. The Italian healthcare system is a regionally based national health service (NHS) that provides comprehensive care financed by general taxation, and where patients are free to choose any publicly funded hospital, even outside their area of residence. The major public hospitals (Aziende Ospedaliere) are granted an independent legal status similar to that of Foundation Trusts in England and are financed via a DRG-based prospective payment system. The remaining public hospitals are managed directly by the Local Health Authorities (LHAs), public organisations responsible for purchasing hospital and community services from a fixed budget to their local population. For treating patients who reside within the region but outside the hospital catchment area, LHA hospitals are refunded by the LHA to which the patient is enrolled through the use of regional DRG tariffs. There are also private (accredited) hospitals that supply less than a fifth of the total hospital care (average of 18%), and whose output-mix is designed to be complementary to that of public hospitals.
3 Hospital reimbursements for patients who reside outside the region are paid on the basis of national DRG tariffs.
In such a setting, where regulated prices are used to allocate public funding and where patients have free choice of public sector treatment that is largely free of charge at the point of delivery, hospitals might have an incentive to raise quality. This may allow to retain local patients, thereby avoiding losses due to cost duplication, and to attract patients residing outside the hospital catchment area as a way of raising revenues (Lippi Bruni & Mammi, 2015) . In the following, we present a theoretical framework based on the Bloom, Propper, Seiler, and Van Reenen (2015) model to illustrate the behaviour and the underlying incentive structure of the hospital decision makers. According to the model, the hospital CEO chooses the level of effort e * that maximises her or his utility function:
where p is a fixed price paid to the hospital for the provision of healthcare; q(z(e), S) is the demand of health-care, which is a function of quality of care, z(e), and a vector of exogenous factors, S; and c(q(z(e), S) and F are the variable and fixed costs, respectively. By assumption, quality increases with hospital effort, z e = (∂z/∂e) > 0, and variable costs increase with both demand and hospital effort, c q = (∂c/∂q)>0 and c q = (∂c/∂e)>0. The first-order condition for utility maximisation is
Equation 2 suggests that effort intensity, (e/q), increases with the price-cost margin, (p − c q ), and decreases with the marginal cost of effort, c e . Moreover, effort intensity increases with the elasticity of demand to the level of effort exerted by the CEO, η q e , ceteris paribus. One of the assumptions underlying the result of Equation 2 is that hospital quality is supposed to be an increasing function of managerial effort. However, the asymmetry of information between providers and patients may introduce a wedge between actual and perceived quality, and it is a matter for empirical investigation whether, and to which extent, increasing effort will translate into improvements in perceived quality. In our empirical application, we test this assumption by estimating whether quality of care, measured in terms of patients' responsiveness, does respond to changes in a vector of supply-side factors that we use to proxy managerial effort. In the next subsection, we highlight the role of such supply-side factors, by reviewing a selected set of previous studies on health system responsiveness and on patient satisfaction.
| Health system responsiveness and its potential determinants
We refer to two strands of literature to identify the supply-side factors that might reflect managerial effort and that might affect responsiveness. 4 The first consists of those studies that perform international comparisons of health system responsiveness and attempt to identify which country characteristics affect responsiveness, whereas the second consists of studies about "patient satisfaction," a concept that partly overlaps with "responsiveness".
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In the first strand of literature, most studies report a positive association between healthcare spending per capita and responsiveness (World Health Organization, 2000; Anderson & Hussey, 2001; Robone et al., 2011) . Low levels of prompt attention, for instance, could be due to shortage of resources to remunerate the health staff or managerial failures (Valentine, De Silva, et al., 2003) . Similarly, low levels of quality of facilities could refer to shortages in hospital funding (World Health Organization, 2000) . Therefore, in analogy with the macro level, we consider health spending at the hospital-specialty level, focusing particularly on the role of non-clinical facilities, as they are conceptually the more closely related to the concept of responsiveness.
It has been argued, however, that responsiveness does not depend only on health spending and that a bivariate association may be a spurious one (World Health Organization, 2000) . Although high costs are required to guarantee some elements of responsiveness (e.g., quality of facilities), this is not necessarily the case for other elements (e.g., dignity and communication)-these may simply require improvements in staff training and awareness (World Health Organization, 2000; Blendon et al., 2001) . For this reason, we investigate the effect of hospital staff training on patients' responsiveness. More generally, institutional and organisational factors play a role at hospital-specialty level in shaping how health systems meet patients' expectations (Blendon et al., 2001; Azfar & Gurgur, 2008) and can be important in mediating the relationship between health-care spending and responsiveness. 6 To identify such factors, we refer to our second strand of literature (i.e., studies of "patient satisfaction").
In the literature on patient satisfaction, staff workload has been found as one of the factors influencing patient satisfaction negatively (Ansmann et al., 2013) . This could be particularly relevant for patient satisfaction with respect to those domains of responsiveness that might imply a strong interaction between patients and staff. As an example, if staff are subject to an excessive workload, their capacity to treat patients respectfully may be impaired (Valentine, De Silva, et al., 2003) . Therefore, we consider as possible supply-side drivers of responsiveness both the medical and nursing staff workloads. In particular, we anticipate nursing staff to have the greatest impact on patients' responsiveness, because they have the closest contact with patients. The importance of the nursing role is suggested by Leiter, Harvie, and Frizzell (1998); Vahey, Aiken, Sloane, Clarke, and Vergas (2004); and Kutney-Lee et al. (2009) , who provide evidence of the key influence of nursing staff, rather than physicians, for patient satisfaction. For this reason, we also investigate the effects of staff composition by considering the expenditure on nursing staff as a share of total staff expenditure. Moreover, because the share of expenditure on administrative staff may affect at least some domains-most notably confidentiality and prompt attentionwe also include this variable in our model. Further, we examine the effect of waiting times on patients' responsiveness. We expect this variable to be strongly correlated to the domain prompt attention. Moreover, this factor could also influence patients' opinion with other domains, because patients frustrated by long waiting times could be more critical when judging such domains.
Finally, many studies have investigated the influence on patient satisfaction of hospital size (e.g., Young et al., 2000; Sjetne et al., 2007; Bacon & Mark, 2009; Hekkert, Cihangir, Kleefstra, Van den Berg, & Kool, 2009; Murante, Seghieri, Brown, & Nuti, 2014) and of case mix (e.g., Bacon & Mark, 2009; Ansmann et al., 2013) . Although these variables are not strictly linked to responsiveness, we include them as controls for the hospital organisational models.
The data are drawn from several sources. First, to derive our measures of responsiveness, we use survey data collected by the Agency for Health Care and Social Services of Emilia-Romagna (Agenzia Sanitaria e Sociale Regionale dell'Emilia-Romagna; ASSR) in years 2008-2012. The survey aimed at investigating in-patient satisfaction with the health-care services provided by public hospitals located in the Region of Emilia-Romagna. 7 The questionnaire was developed by the ASSR, and respondents were selected through sampling procedures based on a probabilistic approach to help ensure that the sample is statistically representative of the group of in-patients treated in each hospital ward. The survey was carried out using a self-administered, pen and paper questionnaire. The help of a caregiver was permitted for patients with severe clinical conditions. More details on the survey design and the sampling procedure are reported in Appendix I. We pool the survey data across all years, ending up with a final sample of 38,696 respondents. The data are clustered into three levels: patients within specialties within hospitals. Different hospitals participated to the survey in different years between 2008 and 2012. The largest collection of data took place in 2010 (44%), with 2% in 2008, 14% in 2009, 22% in 2011, and 18% in 2012. In each survey year, individuals were questioned about their satisfaction with a number of aspects of the health system (21 items), which are part of the standard domains of responsiveness. Table 2 illustrates the correspondence between the items of the ASSR questionnaire and the standard domains of responsiveness as defined by the World Health Organisation and elaborated by Valentine, De Silva, et al. (2003) . The latter domains comprise communication (e.g., clarity of information provided by hospital personnel), confidentiality (e.g., whether sensitive information were privately communicated to patients), dignity (politeness and respectfulness of hospital staff), prompt attention (waiting times), and quality of facilities.
8 Within each responsiveness domain, patients were asked to rate their experience according to six categories: "completely dissatisfied," "very dissatisfied," "dissatisfied," "satisfied," "very satisfied," and "completely satisfied." We aggregate "completely dissatisfied" and "very dissatisfied," because of the very low proportion of responses in these categories. The dataset also contains information on patients' characteristics, which we exploit to build the variables used as regressors in the first-stage analysis. Table 3 provides a brief description and summary statistics for these variables.
To capture patients' health status, we include two dummies. The first is for individuals reporting a poor or moderate health status (poor/moderate health = 1; 0 otherwise), with those being in good or excellent health being the reference category. The other dummy is for individuals stating they have experienced pain during their hospital stay (pain = 1; 0 otherwise). Moreover, the dummies emergency (=1 if accident and emergency hospitalisation; 0 otherwise) and previous hospitalisation (=1 if admitted to the same ward before; 0 otherwise) are also included to account for the kind of treatments received by patients. Further, as 7 Because the survey did not cover day-hospital cases, only ordinary in-patients are included in our sample. 8 In the current study, we adopt a version of the domain quality of facilities, which is as close as possible to the one proposed by the WHO Report (2000) . Indeed, following the operalization made by the WHO, only items regarding cleanliness and space have been used to form this domain. As a robustness check, we have also replicated our empirical analysis by using a more comprehensive version of quality of facilities, which also includes items regarding patient satisfaction with meals and heating, comfort of the bedding, level of quietness and maintenance of the facilities and of the rooms in the ward. Results are qualitatively similar to those shown in the paper and are available upon request.
shown in Table 3 , we also control for other patients' characteristics, including gender, marital status, education, employment status, and location of residence. Finally, the dataset contains information about both the hospital and-within each hospital-the specialty where patients are treated. As previous work has noted, general hospitals provide healthcare services across a range of specialties, which can be viewed as having separate production functions (e.g., Linna & Häkkinen, 2006; Laudicella, Olsen, & Street, 2010) .
10 Given this heterogeneity across specialty units, earlier studies claim that comparing hospital specialties is more appropriate than comparing hospitals (e.g., Harper, Hauck, & Street, 2001) . Therefore, in the first-stage regressions, we include 9 Income and age are not included in the model for either data availability or collinearity reasons. In our sample, most respondents are retired, and thus age and the employment status variables are highly correlated. Data on patients' income are not collected by the ASSR to protect patients' confidentiality.
10 Specialties are groups of the hospital wards that in each hospital share several distinct features, such as the diseases and the type of patients treated, the activities performed, and the type of labour and capital endowment. Examples of specialties included in our sample are orthopaedics, ophthalmology, obstetrics and gynaecology, general medicine, among others. hospital-specialty fixed effects, which allow us to control for unobservable hospital-specialty-specific characteristics that may affect responsiveness. 
| Hospital-specialty data
The final sample used at the second step includes 165 hospital-specialty units, referring to 30 different specialties and 28 public hospitals within Emilia-Romagna. On average, the number of specialties per hospital is six, ranging between 1 and 20. 12 To generate the explanatory variables used in the second step analysis, we employ data drawn from the administrative hospital discharge dataset (Schede di Dimissione Ospedaliera), complemented by data on available beds, labour inputs, and hospital costs provided by the Regional Department of Health. Table 4 offers some descriptive statistics. Because the survey data refer to a sample of patients discharged in years 2008-2012, the data we use to generate the explanatory variables are averaged over the period 2008-2011. 13 As for our key explanatory variables, we use measures of specific supply-side factors related to the items included in each responsiveness domain. First, we calculate the median of inpatient waiting time for patients discharged from each hospital-specialty unit. On average, the median waiting time is approximately 3 weeks.
14 We expect this variable to have a negative impact on the dependent variable capturing the waiting times domain of responsiveness (i.e., prompt attention). Additionally, we examine whether patients' responsiveness is affected by the workload of doctors and nurses. Our workload measures are given by the ratios between the total number of inpatient cases (measured in 1,000 cases) and the total number of full-time equivalent doctors and nurses employed in each hospital-specialty unit. In the sample, there are on average about 137 in-patients per doctor and 136 in-patients per nurse. The last set of key explanatory variables is derived from data on costs recorded at trust-specialty level rather than at hospitalspecialty level. 15 We include the expenditure per patient (in 1,000 Euros) on non-clinical goods and services (food, laundry, beddings, and cleaning materials), and the expenditure (in 1,000 Euros) on staff education and training activities over the sum of the DRG weight units from each hospital-specialty unit. 16 Due to the high degree of correlation (0.91) between the expenditure on non-clinical goods and services and on staff education and training activities, to avoid multicollinearity problems, we run separate regressions including each of these measures in turn. On average, the expenditure on non-clinical goods and services is about 107 Euros per patient, whereas the expenditure on staff education and training activities is about 19 Euros per DRG weight unit. Concerning the proportion of total staff expenditure on nurses and on administrative staff, they are approximately 43% and 5%, respectively. Finally, we include hospital trust dummies to allow for unobserved trust-specific factors, such as management style and human resource policies, that may affect responsiveness and use measures of hospital-specialty size and patient severity as additional control variables. Previous studies examining the determinants of patient satisfaction find evidence that larger hospital units are associated with lower levels of satisfaction (e.g., Young et al., 2000; Meterko, Mohr, & Young, 2004; Sjetne et al., 2007; Hekkert et al., 2009) . In this study, we use the number of beds recorded at hospital-specialty level as a proxy for the hospital-specialty size.
17 The average number of beds for hospital-specialty unit is about 25. Since part of the variation in patients' responsiveness may be due to the heterogeneity across hospital specialties with respect to case mix, we further control for patient case mix, as proxied by the average DRG weight assigned to patients treated in each hospital-specialty unit. In our sample, on average, this is equal to 1.224.
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| METHODS
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of hospital-specialty characteristics on patients' responsiveness, conditional on patients' reporting behaviour. For this purpose, we perform a two-stage analysis using STATA 12.
| First-step analysis
In the first stage, we pool all survey years in a single cross section and estimate a GOP model of the following form (Terza, 1985) 19 :
where the dependent variable y id is an ordered variable that rank patients' evaluation of responsiveness according to five different values from 1 (completely dissatisfied or very dissatisfied) to 5 (completely satisfied) for each respondent i and for each of the five responsiveness domain d listed in Table 2 and described in section 3.1; the latent variable y * id is modelled as a linear function of a vector of exogenous variables (x) plus a random error term ε:
and the unknown threshold values μ j-1 = − ∞, μ j ≤ μ j+1 , μ m = ∞ are assumed to be functions of some explanatory variables (z id ): 15 The majority of hospitals included in our sample are under the direct control of the LHAs. The only exception represented is a teaching hospital that enjoys the status of independent hospital trust, with considerable financial and decision-making autonomy (responsibility for the budget, management, and technical functioning). 16 The choice of the denominator for the latter variable is due to the fact that spending in education and training-which is not compulsory and does not depend on the sheer number of patients-can be more naturally framed as a portfolio choice. In this respect, the value of the delivered DRGs represents the financial budget to be allocated to alternative uses, including, among others, staff education and training activities. 17 The number of inpatient cases is an alternative variable frequently used as a measure of size. However, because this variable is highly correlated with the number of beds (the degree of correlation being equal to 0.81), we could not include it in the regression model.
18 DRG weights reflect the average amount of resources necessary to treat patients with a given diagnosis. Higher DRG weights indicate a higher complexity of patient clinical conditions. 19 In each year, a different set of hospitals collected the data, and we pool observations across all years.
Since four cut points (μ) divide the ordered categorical outcomes, we need to estimate four cut-point equations in the GOP model. The nonlinearity of the model makes it possible to provide only a qualitative interpretation of the estimated parameters β d . Higher values of β d indicate higher levels of patients' responsiveness.
GOP regressions have already been estimated in a number of empirical studies to control for reporting heterogeneity (see, for instance, Pudney & Shields, 2000; Etilé & Milcent, 2006; Jurges, 2007) . 20 The GOP model is a flexible extension of the standard ordered probit (OPROBIT) estimator. Whereas the latter model assumes that individuals adopt homogeneous reporting behaviour by mapping the latent variable to the available response categories in the same way, through a set of constant cut points (Rice et al., 2012) , the former model eliminates the need for such restrictive assumption, allowing for the presence of differences in reporting style.
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In the original dataset, 21 different items of responsiveness were rated by each patient. Although it would be possible to estimate 21 different regression models, this would lead to a burdensome interpretation of the results. Thus, we stratify our sample into five sets, one for each domain of responsiveness. Given that for each responsiveness item the level of satisfaction is recorded, we reshape the dataset from a wide to a long form within each set. A variable called "satisfaction with responsiveness" was created for each of the five responsiveness domains; it represents the patient satisfaction with the domain of responsiveness considered, regardless of the specific item of responsiveness under evaluation. For each responsiveness domain, the percentage of individuals choosing each response category is illustrated in Table 5 . The domain which appears to be best rated is dignity, whereas prompt attention appears as the worst rated.
In order to separate the "true" responsiveness effect from the "reporting heterogeneity" effect, the GOP model requires that the regressors included in the cut-points Equation 5 and in the main responsiveness Equation 4, that is, z id and x id , respectively, are distinct vectors (Pudney & Shields, 2000) . We assume that the variables poor/moderate health and pain do not influence "true" responsiveness. Therefore, we include these variables in the cut-points equation, while excluding them from the main responsiveness specification. 22 The exclusion from the main responsiveness equation of poor/moderate health and pain is based on the observation that it does not appear plausible that the Health Service in Emilia-Romagna is systematically less responsive to individuals who suffer from poor/moderate health or who are in pain. First, from an institutional point of view, health is recognised by the Italian Constitution as a fundamental right of citizens. To guarantee this right, in 1978 the Italian NHS was established as a regional administrative system based on the principles that health-care should be financed through general taxation and should be allocated on the basis of health needs. Each regional health service is inspired by concerns about the equity of healthcare access and financial contribution (France, Taroni, & Donatini, 2005; Ferré et al., 2014) . Second, from an empirical point of view, Glorioso and Subramanian (2014) provided evidence that in the Italian NHS the objective of horizontal equity is met for access to hospitalisation, with no discrimination due to patients' health status. On the basis of such 20 See also Jones and Schurer (2011) for more references to GOP models. 21 If the assumption of homogeneous reporting behaviour does not hold, then the effects on responsiveness estimated using the OPROBIT will be biased, reflecting both the "true" responsiveness effect and the reporting heterogeneity effect. 22 This assumption implies that individuals who suffer more pain or experience bad health have higher expectations from the health service. Their higher expectations produce a bias in their reporting of responsiveness, which is taken into account by the GOP model. Differently, with regard to x i variables, we are not able to assume that they solely affect "true" responsiveness, and we interpret them as having combined effects ("true" responsiveness effect plus "reporting heterogeneity" effect). evidence, because the concepts of "responsiveness" and "access to care" share several features (e.g. waiting times) (Valentine, De Silva, et al., 2003) , the Italian NHS is unlikely to be considered inequitable with regard to responsiveness too. 
| Second-step analysis
In the second-step analysis, we use an estimated dependent variable model (Lewis & Linzer, 2005) to analyse the role of hospital-specialty characteristics in explaining variations in patients' responsiveness. By each responsiveness domain, the estimated coefficients for the hospital-specialty dummies derived from the first stage are regressed against a set of supply-side factors. An example of this modelling strategy can be found in Robone et al. (2011) , who examine how health system responsiveness can be affected by country characteristics at aggregate level. The estimated coefficients reflect the relative levels of responsiveness across hospital specialties. 24 By each responsiveness domain, the model is estimated on a pool of 165 hospital specialties. Huber-White robust standard errors (White, 1980) are applied because heteroskedasticity from sampling variation in the estimated levels of hospital-specialty-specific responsiveness might be induced when using an estimated dependent variable model (Lewis & Linzer, 2005) .
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5 | RESULTS Table 6 contains the results from the GOP model in the first step. Across the five responsiveness domains, the coefficients of poor/moderate health and pain are positive and mostly statistically significant in the cut-points 1 and 2 equations, whereas they are negative and mostly statistically significant in the cut-point 4 equation. This evidence suggests that patients in poor/moderate health and in pain tend to use more the extreme categories of responsiveness (completely or very dissatisfied or completely satisfied) compared to patients who are not in such conditions.
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Tables 7 and 8 present, for each responsiveness domain, the results obtained from the second-step regressions. The difference between Tables 7 and 8 is that, whereas the former shows the effect of spending on non-clinical facilities, the effect of spending on staff education and training activities is estimated in Table 8 . The results of the Ramsey regression specification-error test, reported in the last row of the two tables, provide no evidence of functional form misspecification.
The coefficient of the waiting time variable is negative and highly significant for the domain prompt attention, suggesting a strong and negative association between actual waiting times and the patients' reported level of responsiveness with respect to waiting times. Although we find a strong negative association between nursing staff workload and patients' responsiveness for the communication and confidentiality domains, the effect of medical staff workload is never significant. Overall, the proportion of total staff expenditure in nursing staff has a positive and significant impact, whereas the proportion of total staff expenditure in administrative staff has a positive and significant effect only for the domain prompt attention. Not surprisingly, these findings highlight the crucial role of nursing staff on the patients' experience of contact with the health system (Leiter et al., 1998; Vahey et al., 2004, and Kutney-Lee et al., 2009 ). In addition, our result for the impact of the proportion of total staff expenditure on administrative staff for the waiting times domain supports the 23 The same identification assumption was adopted in Fiorentini et al. (2015) . 24 For example, if hospital-specialty A shows a greater (positive) coefficient than hospital-specialty B, we can interpret this difference as hospital-specialty A being more responsive to patients' expectations than hospital-specialty B, ceteris paribus. 25 In alternative to our two-stage model, we might have explored the use of a multilevel single-stage model. Multilevel single-stage models have been employed in previous studies of health system responsiveness (e.g., Valentine, Verdes-Tennant, & Bonsel, 2015) . In a multilevel single-stage model, the unexplained error term is decomposed into different random components attributable to each level of the hierarchy and assumed to have 0 mean and constant variance (Rice & Jones, 1997) . However, the estimation of a single-stage model requires the assumption that the random components across hierarchical levels are uncorrelated. This assumption may be restrictive in our application, because unobserved patient severity may be correlated with provider units. 26 We have also estimated an OPROBIT model by regressing patients' rating of responsiveness on the sets of variables illustrated in section 3.1 (results are available on request). In the OPROBIT model, the estimated coefficients on poor/moderate health and pain are negative and strongly statistically significant for all responsiveness domains. However, for the reasons explained in section 4.1, it is implausible that the Health Service in Emilia-Romagna is systematically less responsive to patients who are in poor/moderate health and in pain. We interpret these results as evidence of the negative effect of such conditions on patients' reporting behaviour, supporting the use of the GOP model instead of the OPROBIT one, and the validity of our exclusion restrictions. Other evidence supports this choice. For both poor/moderate health and pain, results from a Wald test across the four cut-points allow to reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are jointly equal to 0, thus indicating that the cut points are functions of these variables (results are available on request). Moreover, for each responsiveness domain, the values of the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria show that the best fit to the data is obtained using the GOP model rather than the OPROBIT one (results are also available on request). hypothesis advanced by Valentine, De Silva, et al. (2003) suggesting that increasing the proportion of administrative staff on total staff expenditure improves the hospitals' ability to manage the waiting lists. Concerning the expenditure on nonclinical goods and services, we find a positive and significant association for all domains. This finding is in line with previous evidence provided at country-level (World Health Organization, 2000; Anderson & Hussey, 2001; Robone et al., 2011) . A positive and significant effect on all domains of responsiveness is also found for the expenditure on staff education and training activities. This result also provides evidence for what has been previously suggested in the literature (World Health Organization, 2000; Blendon et al., 2001 ). The remaining rows in Tables 7 and 8 report the estimates for our control variables. We find evidence of a negative and significant association between the number of available beds and responsiveness across all domains. This is consistent with the results of previous studies, which suggests a negative association between hospital size and patient satisfaction (e.g., Young et al., 2000; Meterko et al., 2004; Sjetne et al., 2007; Hekkert et al., 2009) , and may reflect possible diseconomies of scale due to, for example, problems of coordination and cooperation in larger hospital-specialty units. Overall, patient severity appears also to be a relevant determinant of responsiveness. The positive influence of patient case mix on responsiveness implies, on average, a higher ability of staff to meet patients' expectations in those hospital specialties where there are more severe cases. Possible explanations are that, in those hospital-specialty units where patient complexity is higher, doctors and nurses are characterised by a higher degree of motivation and/or make greater efforts to reduce the risk of malpractice claims.
| DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the role of hospital-specialty characteristics in explaining variations in the health system' responsiveness rated by a sample of about 38,700 in-patients treated in public hospitals located in the Italian Region of Emilia-Romagna. The hospital-specialty characteristics that we analysed are used as proxies of managerial effort and allow us to test the theoretical assumption underlying previous studies (Bloom et al., 2015) according to which hospital quality, which we measured in terms of patients' evaluation of responsiveness, is an increasing function of managerial effort. Overall, our findings suggest that the supply-side factors considered play a relevant role for responsiveness. More precisely, we find a strong negative association between nursing staff workload and responsiveness for the communication and confidentiality domains. In addition, our analysis reveals a positive and significant association between responsiveness and the proportion of total staff expenditure invested in nursing staff. Moreover, our results point to a strong positive effect on responsiveness of the expenditure on non-clinical facilities and on staff education and training activities. Last, for the domain prompt attention, we find a positive and significant effect on responsiveness of the proportion of total staff expenditure invested in administrative staff, and a negative and significant effect of actual waiting times. Our study has some limitations. Although the sample used at the first step of our analysis includes a large number of patientlevel observations, the one employed at the second step comprises a relatively small number of hospital-specialty units. This data limitation has prevented us from exploring potential differences in the patients' evaluation of responsiveness across hospital specialties. Future studies might benefit from using a larger sample for the second-step estimation. This may also allow future research to examine possible differences in the impact of supply-side factors on responsiveness across specialties within hospitals. We might expect such differences to arise between, for example, surgical and medical specialties, given the different experience of patients with medical and nursing staff across specialties. Further, future studies may also take advantage from the use of additional information on the type of investments on non-clinical goods, and on education and training activities, to investigate the transmission channels linking the supply-side factors to responsiveness.
Because vignettes have not been included in the questionnaires administered by the ASSR, we could not apply the hierarchical ordered probit (HOPIT) model, which has instead been used by several studies investigating the issue of reporting heterogeneity for responsiveness (e.g., Valentine, Ortiz, et al., 2003; Sirven et al., 2012; Rice et al., 2012) . 27 However, although the GOP model does not allow the disentanglement of the "true" effects on responsiveness from the "reporting style" effect, it enables us to account for some forms of biases in reporting style, thanks to the identification restrictions we make. 28 Whereas the identification assumption imposed by the GOP model is not required by the HOPIT model, the latter requires other assumptions, known as vignette equivalence and response consistency, whose tenability has been questioned and is currently a subject of extensive debate (see, e.g., Bago d'Uva, Lindeboom, ODonnell, & Van Doorslaer, 2011; Peracchi & Rossetti, 2013; Robone, 2016) . More generally, because the inclusion of vignettes within a survey increases both the financial costs of implementing that survey and the risk of inducing fatigue effects in the respondents (King & Wand, 2007; Rice et al., 2012; Peracchi & Rossetti, 2013) , few datasets include vignettes. Therefore, using the GOP model can result helpful in purging self-reports from some reporting heterogeneity when vignettes are not available. Despite its limitations, our paper is the first attempt, as far as we know, to shed some light into the black box of the determinants of responsiveness at hospital-specialty level. By investigating the supply-side effects on responsiveness, we are also able to provide some evidence in favour of the use of self-reported measures of responsiveness as credible indicators of how patients are treated by the health system. In particular, for the domains prompt attention and quality of facilities, we are able to compare subjective and objective measures of responsiveness, as has been done, for instance, with regard to health status (Crossley & Kennedy, 2002; Baker et al., 2004; Jurges, 2007) . The two types of measures appear to be strongly correlated, suggesting that patients' self-reported measures can be considered as valid predictors of more objective measures of responsiveness. Therefore, NHS managers and policymakers can regard self-reported measures of responsiveness as reliable information sources that can be used as governance tools to improve the performance of decentralised units.
However, our analysis also shows that taking action based on the results of a responsiveness survey alone, without controlling for the supply-side variables, may lead to serious misallocations of resources. Indeed, if relatively poor results (in terms of patients' evaluation of health service) in given hospital units are reported, more intensive monitoring or the enforcement of incentives/sanctions should be contemplated only after taking into consideration possible shortages in critical resources, such as nursing staff, non-clinical goods and services, or investment in staff training.
More generally, in the last decades, there has been a growing need to adopt patients' self-reported measures of quality to balance the charge that the supply of health services is increasingly shaped in response to providers' interests. This calls for further methodological refinements in both the design and the interpretation of such measures, starting from the need to take into account the role of the supply-side factors.
27 "Vignettes represent hypothetical descriptions of fixed levels of a latent construct, such as responsiveness […] Since the vignettes are fixed and predetermined, any systematic variation across individuals in the rating of the vignettes can be attributed to differences in reporting behavior" (Rice et al., 2012) . 28 Both the HOPIT and the GOP models are specified through the use of two equations, where the first equation represents the "true" effect of some covariates on the variable of interest in the analysis (main equation), whereas the second equation represents the effect of some covariates on the reporting behaviour of the respondents (reporting bias equation). Whilst when estimating the HOPIT model, thanks to the additional information provided by vignettes, the same set of covariates can be included both in the main equation and in the reporting bias equation, this is not possible when estimating the GOP model. Because of the lack of additional information provided by vignettes, identifying the GOP model requires that the variables included in the reporting bias equation are used exclusively in that equation. A second set of variables has to be used in the main equation. The impossibility of including a variable both in the main equation and in the reporting bias equation is the main limitation of the GOP model.
